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Mind 2005 114(453):1-30; doi:10.1093/mind/fzi001
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© Fara and Williamson 2005

Counterparts and Actuality

Michael Fara1 and Timothy Williamson2

1 Sage School of Philosophy, 218 Goldwin Smith Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853, USA michael.fara{at}cornell.edu, 2 New College, Oxford OX1 3BN, UK timothy.williamson{at}philosophy.oxford.ac.uk

Many philosophers, following David Lewis, believe that we should look to counterpart theory, not quantified modal logic, as a means of understanding modal discourse. We argue that this is a mistake. Significant parts of modal discourse involve either implicit or explicit reference to what is actually the case, raising the question of how talk about actuality is to be represented counterpart-theoretically. By considering possible modifications of Lewis's counterpart theory, including actual modifications due to Graeme Forbes and Murali Ramachandran, we argue that no coherent version of counterpart theory can provide a plausible representation of talk about actuality, and so, we conclude, counterpart theory should be rejected.


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